Abstract: This paper examines how trade liberalisation affects innovation, profits and welfare in a reciprocal markets model when firms pre-commit to R&D investment. First, we show that, for a range of trade costs, there are multiple equilibria, implying that the path of trade liberalisation is not unique. Second, welfare at "incipient" trade always exceeds welfare in autarky. Third, we show that, if the effectiveness of R&D is sufficiently high, trade always yields higher welfare than autarky. These new results suggests that when firms, operating in an oligopolistic environment, strategically precommit to R&D, the welfare gains from trade liberalisation are enhanced.
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Introduction
In this paper we examine how trade liberalisation affects welfare when firms invest in research and development (R&D). Central to our study is the behaviour of large and highly productive international firms. Firms that combine these characteristics have recently been described in the literature as "superstar firms" (Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) ; Neary (2010) ). Recent empirical work suggests that it is the combination of exporting and investing in R&D that may explain the high productivity of these corporations. 1 There is an increased realisation, both in the academic community and among policy makers, that these corporate superstars, though only a small minority among all active firms, at the same time essentially drive the international performance of some countries.
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In addition, the markets in which these large international R&D-intensive firms compete tend to be highly concentrated. 3 It is well documented that large firms behave differently compared to small firms. Large firms can use R&D and indeed other investments strategically in the battle with rivals, both to help them penetrate into foreign markets and defend their market share at home. Since models of perfect competition or monopolistic competition do not address strategic interaction between competitors, we model firms as setting their R&D in an oligopolistic environment. 4 In oligopoly, R&D investment can be used by firms as a commitment device to ensure higher output and thus maintain and increase market share. 5 Process R&D improves a firm's profitability in two ways: directly, through a reduction in production costs, and indirectly, through the effect on its rivals' output. We show how this investment commitment has important implications for the effects of trade liberalisation on firm productivity and social welfare. We derive the comparative static effects of trade liberalisation on outputs, exports, R&D levels, profits and welfare. First, trade 1 See, for instance, Aw et al. (2008) . 2 The importance of large firms in international markets has also been discussed in the economic press (see, for instance, a relatively recent article in The Economist ("Big is Back" August 27, 2009). 3 It is a stylised fact that only a few firms are responsible for the bulk of R&D expenditures. According to a recent report by Booz and Company (2012) ,"The Global Innovation 1000", the top 100 biggest R&D spenders worldwide accounted for 62% of total R&D spending. Computing and Electronics companies alone accounted for 28% of total R&D spending. Other big R&D spenders are the healthcare and automobile sectors. All these sectors are dominated by a few big players. 4 Explicitly modelling large firms' behaviour can give new or additional insights in several real-world phenomena observed in international markets. Neary (2010) gives a list of examples. 5 See the seminal paper by Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) .
3 was set up to consider multilateral trade liberalisation between two identical countries, with firms competing in a Cournot manner. 8 The pioneers of the RM model demonstrated that intra-industry trade can occur in equilibrium even when goods are identical and that welfare is U-shaped in trade costs: starting at prohibitively high trade costs, a small fall in trade costs first reduces welfare but, as trade costs fall further, welfare starts to increase. 9 Importantly, there is no investment in their model.
In a recent paper, Van Long et al. (2011) incorporate R&D investment in a RM model with trade liberalisation and combine it with an extension of the Melitz model with firm heterogeneity (Melitz (2003) ). Since they focus on the firm selection effect of trade liberalisation on R&D, they justifiably assume that output decisions are made under asymmetric information and a firm's R&D investment has no effect on the output choice of rival firms. This assumption is equivalent to assuming that outputs and R&D are determined simultaneously by each firm.
Since we are interested in the effects of R&D decisions of large firms that behave strategically, we assume instead that R&D decisions are effectively made prior to output decisions and hence will affect rival firms' outputs. More specifically, we examine how firms may use innovation as a commitment device to adopt an aggressive stance both in the domestic and the export market. In modelling R&D investment, we follow the standard approach in models of strategic investment commitment, pioneered by d 'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) (but, unlike the latter, we do so in an open-economy RM set-up). We show that whether or not firms pre-commit to R&D i.e., prior to the outputs being set with the purpose of keeping the rival's output down matters significantly for the welfare effects of trade liberalisation. Note that this aspect of investment choice is absent in Van Long et al. (2011) ; including strategic commitment to R&D in their model would make it intractable. Similarly, to ensure tractability of our model, we abstract from the firm selection effect of trade liberalisation on R&D, which they focus on. For these reasons, the results in our paper differ from theirs. Since the 4 topic of our paper is similar, but the set-up and hence the results are different, we argue that our paper is complementary to theirs.
Clearly, if trade costs are sufficiently high, then just as in the RM model without investment no trade can occur and the firms are monopolists in their domestic markets.
We find that multilateral trade liberalisation increases R&D-spending and firm productivity for all trade costs at which trade actually occurs and always benefits consumers. We find that, as trade costs are lowered from the prohibitive level, we initially pass through a region of trade costs in which there are two stable equilibria. At one of these, there is intra-industry trade and at the other, there is no trade. Further liberalisation leads to a disappearance of the no-trade equilibrium. When trade occurs, profits are U-shaped in trade costs but always remain below the autarky profit level. Our welfare results differ from those in the standard RM model in the sense that it is not necessarily true that limited trade liberalisation lowers welfare below the autarky welfare level. In fact, we show that, if R&D is sufficiently effective in lowering production costs, trade always yields higher welfare than autarky. The reason for this lies in the fact that firms choose investment prior to outputs with the intention to strategically manipulate their rivals' behaviour. We show that, although this strategic behaviour is mutually harmful to firms in a symmetric set-up, the R&D game is a prisoner's dilemma, it encourages innovation, benefits consumers and is welfare improving in an overall sense.
So, while governments have an incentive to open up sectors in which firms are investing intensively in R&D to foreign competition, they can at the same time expect a resistance to such liberalisation by those innovating firms.
In Section 2, we develop a RM model with R&D investment. In Section 3, we derive firms' innovation reaction functions. In section 4, we determine the equilibria of the game for different levels of trade costs. We subsequently discuss the effects of multilateral trade liberalisation on R&D, consumer surplus, profits and overall welfare in section 5. Section 6 examines the effect of market size, firm efficiency and policy asymmetries on the model's results. Section 7 concludes.
The model
A country's welfare is the sum of its consumer surplus (CS) and the profit of its own firm (for simplicity, we assume firms are entirely owned by domestic residents). For the Home country, welfare is given by:
where 2 / 2 Q CS  .
Note that we assume that firms are ex ante symmetric and markets are equal in size.
These assumptions are relaxed in section 6.
The game
Firms play a two-stage game, in which they simultaneously choose innovation levels, i x (i=1,2), in the first stage and subsequently choose outputs for each market in the second stage. Hence, output levels will depend on innovation levels. Since we must solve the game by backward induction, we begin by considering the output-setting stage before considering optimal choice of R&D.
Stage 2: Outputs
At the output stage, firms take R&D-levels as given. When both firms are active in both markets, respective Cournot-Nash outputs for firm 1 and firm 2 for the "Home" country market are:
while they produce: 
with superscript M indicating monopoly.
Note that expressions (4a)-(5b) indicate that, given sufficiently low i x , sufficiently high j x ( i j  ) and high enough trade cost, it is possible that even when output for the domestic market is positive, firm i is not able to export. Hence, we distinguish between four possible export status combinations: two-way trade, (E,E), one way-trade with firm 1 exporting while firm 2 does not, (E,0), one-way trade with firm 2 exporting while firm 1 does not, (0,E), and autarky, (0,0).
Stage 1: Innovation
In this subsection as a first step to considering the different possible equilibria in section 4 we derive a firm's innovation best response function under the different regimes, (0,0), (E,E), (0,E) and (E,0). For expositional purposes and without loss of generality, we will adopt the perspective of firm 1. The best response function for firm 2 is derived analogously.
Autarky
In autarky, profit maximisation implies
. In this case investment is simply chosen to minimise total costs given output. We can rewrite
, which yields:
The marginal production cost reduction chosen by firm 1 in autarky is therefore given by:
where we use superscript 00 to indicate that neither firm exports (autarky). Clearly, 
Two-way trade
At this point, a note on terminology is in order. When firms meet in one or more markets, investment also serves as a commitment device to be more aggressive in the output setting stage and thus to reduce rival output. In those circumstances quantitycompeting firms choose investment above the cost minimising level. Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1984) and Tirole (1988) , we refer to choosing investment above the cost-minimising level to influence the rival's output choice as choosing investment "strategically".
Bearing all this in mind, let us consider firm 1's 1
x best-response function when there is two-way trade, that is, when both firms export to each other's domestic market. Firm 1's first-order condition for innovation is now given by: 
from expressions (4b) and (5b); note that
from the final stage. The second and third terms on the righthand side of expression (9) are both positive and capture the effect of strategic investment commitment in the Home and Foreign markets, respectively. Since these two terms  which were not present in the autarky case are positive, the first term on the right-hand side has to be negative. This in turn implies that investment is chosen above the costminimising level.
Expression (9) can be rewritten as 0
It is instructive to compare expressions (7) and (10). When firms are engaged in trade, they have access to a wider market (producing
for the domestic and the export market, instead of just 1 q for the domestic market) and hence invest more in innovation. Crucially, when firms engage in two-way trade, innovation also affects their profits indirectly, i.e., firms will choose their investment trying to manipulate rival output. As a result, trading firms do not only invest more in R&D, they also choose more R&D investment per unit of output (in autarky, the investment-to-output ratio is  , while here it is  ) 3 / 4 ( ). We refer to the increase in the investment-to-output ratio, resulting from the strategic investment commitment, as an increase in "the aggressiveness of investment".
Substituting for optimally chosen output levels in expression (10) 
One-way trade
We now turn to firm 1's innovation best-response function when there is only one-way trade.
We first derive its best response function when it does not export ( 0 * 1  q ) and faces competition in its domestic market from firm 2 ( 1 q and 2 q are given by expressions (4a) and (4b), respectively). The first-order condition for 1 x is then:
, and
The second term on the right-hand side of expression (12) x R E , 13 To ensure stability in all cases we restrict  to be less than 0.375.
where, here and henceforth, the first superscript refers to firm 1's exporting status, while the second refers to firm 2's (thus, the superscript 0E indicates that firm 1 is not exporting while firm 2 is exporting). It is given by:
Next, we derive firm 1's innovation best response function when firm 1 exports to and competes in Foreign with firm 2, but does not face any competition from firm 2 in its
are given by expressions (5a) and (5b), respectively, while M q 1 is given by (6)). The first-order condition for 1 x is then:
. Now, the best response for firm 1 is:
Equilibrium outcomes
In this section we derive the equilibrium innovation and trading outcomes at different levels of trade costs. Before doing this we consider two symmetric candidate equilibria.
Clearly, at high enough trade costs the countries do not trade. For low enough trade costs, given ex-ante symmetry between firms, symmetric two-way trade is a clear candidate for an equilibrium. We now fully characterise these two symmetric candidate equilibria, autarky and two-way trade, and subsequently determine the range of trade costs for which each of these is an equilibrium outcome.
When autarky prevails, firms' innovation levels are given by expression (8). Use of (8) in expression (6) gives the autarky output level:
With two-way trade, the symmetric equilibrium investment level is obtained from (11) and the corresponding reaction function for firm 2, and is given by:
Use of this in the expression for outputs (expressions (4a)-(5b)) yields:
From expression (18b), it is clear that (E,E) cannot be an equilibrium for
. However, as the next lemma shows, this does not imply that autarky, (0,0), cannot be an equilibrium below t . 
Lemma: When firms commit to R&D levels prior to choosing outputs in a reciprocal
Comparing the expressions for t~ and t , t t follows immediately.
■
Using the lemma, we now determine the equilibrium outcomes for the entire range of t.
We refer to trade costs in the interval   t t, as "high", while trade costs above t are "prohibitive".
Equilibrium outcomes for "high" trade costs
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In this subsection we determine the equilibrium outcomes for
, that is, for the range of trade costs over which we cannot a priori exclude either trade or autarky. This particular region of trade costs is the most complex one in the sense that the reaction functions needed to determine the equilibria will cross all the different trading regimes.
Thus, using each firm's innovation best response function for each trading regime, as derived in subsection 3.2, we now need to show how the various regime-specific segments of the innovation reaction function fit together.
We proceed as follows. We first demarcate the different trading regimes in ( figure 1a . Subsequently, we trace out the innovation reaction function for firm 1 as it passes through these different trading regimes. This is illustrated in figure 1b . Finally, we use the reaction functions of firm 1 and firm 2 to derive the equilibrium (see figure 2 ).
[ Figure 1a and b about here]
To enable us to demarcate the different trading regimes, figure 1a depicts what we will refer to as the zero-export loci for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively labelled by 0 * 1  q and 0 2  q . In fact, these represent the non-negative export constraint for each firm when they are binding. From expression (5a), it is clear that when the non-negative export constraint for firm 1 is binding, it implies:
Similarly, when the non-negative export constraint for firm 2 is binding, it implies:
from expression (4b). In figure 1a , to the left of the 0 x (expression (8)). Firm 1 will choose the autarky 1
x -level as its best response to 2
When 2 x falls below 2 x , firm 1 exports to Foreign, but firm 2 remains active only in its own domestic market (area 4 of figure 1a), hence firm 1's best response is given by (15)).
So far, we have not yet determined firm 1's best response for 2
x -values ranging between 2 x and 2 x . In contrast to the pure autarky region, for this range of 2 x , firm 1 does choose R&D "strategically" (i.e., above the cost minimising level, as explained in subsection 3.2.2.). However, because firm 2's non-negative export constraint binds, it places a limit on firm 1's strategic investment (since rival exports can, of course, never be induced to turn negative) and R&D is chosen to reduce firm 2's imports to exactly zero.
We will refer to such a scenario as one of export "deterrence". Using (19a), the export deterring innovation reaction function of firm 1 can be written explicitly as: [ Table 1 about here]
There are three equilibria (see figure 2) . The equilibrium at point O is stable and implies autarky; the autarky innovation level for each firm is given by expression (8). The equilibrium at point E is also stable and involves two-way trade; the two-way trade equilibrium level of innovation for each firm is given by expression (17) above.
[ Figure 2 about here]
The equilibrium at point U is unstable; at U, each firm produces for its domestic market only and chooses its R&D to keep its rival's exports equal to zero. Using equations (19a) and (19b) 
Equilibrium outcome for "prohibitive" trade costs
When trade costs increase, area 3 in Figure 1a expands at the expense of area 1. In fact, for t t , the two-way trade equilibrium has now disappeared (as has the unstable equilibrium). This case is depicted in Figure 3a ; the reaction functions intersect only once (at point O); now, autarky is the unique equilibrium.
[ Figures 3a and b about here] 
Equilibrium outcome for "low" trade costs
Suppose that trade costs decrease below t~. As a result, for t t , the zero-export locus 0 * 1  q in Figure 1 shifts to the left, while the other zero-export locus, 0 2  q , shifts down. Hence, area 3 in Figure 1 contracts, whereas area 1 expands. Below t , the autarky equilibrium has vanished and, with it, the unstable equilibrium. Figure 3b shows 15 an example of what the innovation reaction functions look like in that case. They only intersect once (at point E); only the two-way trade equilibrium remains.
Equilibrium outcomes at different trade costs
The following proposition summarises the equilibrium outcomes at different levels of trade costs. ). With trade, optimal investment is given by expression (17) and equilibrium output levels by expressions (18a)-(18b).
(ii) For t t , there is no trade (see lemma), and each firm is a monopolist in its domestic market; hence, autarky prevails. The autarky investment level is given by expression (8) and output is by expression (16). 
Compared to autarky (expression (7)), firms invest more (as they produce for the export market as well), but their innovation-to-output ratio ( ) is the same as in autarky; in short, investment is chosen less aggressively than when firms precommit to R&D investment. Substituting for outputs in (22), we obtain:
where S refer to the simultaneous-move benchmark case.
Also, in the hypothetical benchmark, it is straightforward to show that there is only one threshold, ) 2
, above which autarky is the unique equilibrium and below which the trading equilibrium is unique (note that t t 
). This means that, unlike in our full model with strategic commitment to investment, there is no region with multiple equilibria in the simultaneous-move benchmark.
Multilateral trade liberalisation
In this section, we investigate how innovation, profits, consumer surplus and welfare are affected as trade costs change and discuss to what extent the effect on these variables is different in the simultaneous-move benchmark. Starting at a prohibitive level, we lower the trade cost parameter t, until it is zero, thereby effectively capturing a process of multilateral trade liberalisation. As countries first liberalise trade and as t falls below t but remains above t~, they enter a region in which there are two stable equilibria (see Proposition 1): countries will either remain in autarky, or start to engage in two-way trade. Only when trade liberalisation is sufficiently drastic, i.e., implying a fall in trade costs such that t falls below t~, will two-way trade be guaranteed. In short, the path of trade liberalisation is not unique. While a limited degree of trade liberalisation may generate trade between the countries involved, it does not guarantee it. Instead, the integrating countries may be "trapped" in autarky until a more radical degree of trade liberalisation is attained.
As we have seen above, given our assumption that the countries are symmetric and the multilateral trade liberalisation takes a symmetric form, the equilibria themselves are always symmetric. We can therefore focus on the effects of trade liberalisation on Home as the effects on Foreign are identical. Figure 4a depicts the level of innovation, captured by the cost reduction, i
Innovation
x , as a function of trade costs. In our model with strategic investment commitment, firms' innovation levels when they are engaged in trade are -as discussed in section 3.2-different from those chosen when firms are in autarky. With trade, they can expect to sell more as they have access to a wider market, which tends to raise the return on investment.
Furthermore, when firms compete on the same markets with each other, R&D is  as we have seen  chosen more aggressively than in autarky to affect rival outputs: firms choose more R&D investment per unit of output when they face a rival firm in headtohead competition than they do in the absence of trade. In the figure, the solid curve,
EE i
x , represents innovation with two-way trade, 00 i x is innovation under autarky, and the dashed curve,
, depicts innovation with mutual export deterrence.
[Figures 4a, b, c and d about here]
In section 4.5 we introduced the hypothetical simultaneous-move ("non-strategic") benchmark case in which firms cannot precommit to investment before outputs are set.
When engaged in trade, firms' innovation levels in our model (see Figure 4a ) are higher at each level of trade costs than the innovation levels in the hypothetical benchmark (depicted in Figure 4b ). In both figures, the cost reduction is linear in the trade cost when the firm is trading, with lower t leading to more innovation. x (at given t) in Figure 4b and no region with multiple equilibria.
Profits
Figure 4c represents how trade affects firms' profits when firms choose investment strategically. As depicted in the figure, there is a discrete fall in profits when firms start to trade. This is due to the fact that, compared to monopolist firms under autarky, trading firms choose their investment more aggressively. In fact, from the point of view of the firms, trade is a prisoner's dilemma outcome. In the simultaneous-move benchmark game, profits (not depicted) do not exhibit a discrete drop when firms start trading as in that case investment is not chosen more aggressively than in autarky.
Profits are, both in our model with strategic precommitment to R&D and in the benchmark, U-shaped in trade cost and higher in autarky than under completely free trade. In the neighbourhood of free trade, the trade cost works like a tax, reducing the firms' profits. However, when trade costs are nearly prohibitive, they, although reducing profits on export sales, serve to protect the now relatively much more important own market profits from import competition. Hence, in this region profits increase in trade costs.
Consumer surplus
To see how trade affects consumers when firms set R&D before outputs, we examine how trade costs affect consumer surplus (see Figure 4d) . Consumption of the imperfectly competitive good increases for two reasons as trade is liberalised. Firstly, total output increases at given R&D levels due to the fall in the level of the trade costs. Secondly, the increase in R&D resulting from trade liberalisation leads to a further increase in output.
The net result is that trade liberalisation reduces the price of imperfectly competitive good and raises consumer surplus. Note that the price is always lower and the consumers are better off under trade, no matter how small the volume of trade, than they are under autarky.
Note that, at given t, trade will always result in lower prices and thus higher consumer surplus, when firms pre-commit to R&D than in the simultaneous-move benchmark.
Welfare
We calculate welfare in the two stable equilibria, autarky and two-way trade. Using expressions (8) and (16) into the expression for welfare (3) yields the welfare level in autarky, which with symmetry is equal to: 
In the simultaneous-move benchmark, a small reduction in trade costs from the prohibitive level always results in welfare falling below the autarky level. This hypothetical benchmark is represented in Figure 5c . When firms commit to R&D before setting output, it remains true that, at high levels of trade costs, a small reduction in t can lead to a fall in welfare. However, when the trade cost is high enough for autarky and trade to co-exist as equilibrium outcomes, i.e., for
, the trading equilibrium always yields higher welfare (see Figures 5a and b) . . ■
[Figures 5a, b and c about here]
As explained in section 5.1, firms that face competition through trade chose their R&D investment levels more aggressively than in autarky: R&D per unit of output is therefore 21 higher than in autarky. This strategic aggressiveness in choosing R&D when firms face a rival firm in head-to-head competition increases in η, the relative effectiveness of R&D.
While this reduces a firm's profit below the autarky profit level (see Figure 4c) , it raises consumer surplus above the autarky level (see Figure 4d ) and it does so by more if the relative effectiveness of R&D is higher. As a result, a vertical gap opens up between the W EE and the W 00 loci (see Figures 5a and 5b) . When the relative effectiveness of R&D is very small, this gap is not very significant and the minimum of the W EE -locus still lies below W 00 . As η rises a threshold is eventually passed whereby the W EE is everywhere higher than that of W 00 and welfare in the trading equilibrium exceeds welfare under autarky for all trade costs. This case is depicted in Figure 5a . As will be formally stated in proposition 4, when the effectiveness of R&D ( ) is sufficiently high, welfare with trade no matter how limited that trade is is higher than in autarky. It is precisely the fact that firms pre-commit strategically to R&D and hence choose a level of R&D above the level that minimises costs that allows for the possibility that the trading equilibrium guarantees higher welfare than autarky. Evidently, when R&D effectiveness is low, welfare with trade can fall below the level under autarky. This is illustrated in Figure 5b . . We can make use of (24) and (25) to show that this condition implies
This condition simplifies to . ■ So, pre-commitment to R&D investment in the trading equilibrium, combined with a sufficiently high degree of R&D effectiveness, will in fact ensure that trade is socially superior to autarky for every degree of trade liberalisation. Without such pre-commitment i.e., in the hypothetical simultaneous-move benchmark even a high degree of R&D effectiveness cannot prevent welfare from falling below the autarky level for some levels of trade liberalisation.
Asymmetries
In the previous sections, we assumed that all aspects of the model are symmetric. In this section, we relax the symmetry assumptions and explore the role of different types of asymmetries. To avoid an excessive taxonomy of cases, we focus in particular on one type of asymmetry, i.e., market size asymmetry. We also briefly mention how asymmetric trade liberalisation and cost asymmetries between firms affect our results.
Asymmetric market size
In this subsection we allow for the markets to differ in size. The Home and Foreign firms remain ex ante identical with identical production and innovation cost functions.
However, even under autarky the ex ante identical firms will have different cost outcomes as the firm located in the larger market produces more given the higher domestic demand. Hence, its incentive to innovate is stronger, leading to more innovation and thus resulting in lower marginal production costs. However, when trade costs are zero, each firm can serve both markets equally well and equilibrium outputs, innovation and costs are the same for both firms.
As trade costs fall from the prohibitive level, it is a priori not obvious which market will be invaded first. On the one hand, since export markets are particularly attractive when they are large, one could argue that firms with small domestic markets have a larger incentive to penetrate those export markets than firms with a large domestic market; this would imply that the larger market will be invaded first. On the other hand, since innovation is positively correlated with firm size, firms with a large domestic market have, prior to entering potential export markets, invested more in innovation than their counterparts with a smaller sized domestic market and are hence lower-cost larger firms, which will find it easier to penetrate those export market. This would imply that the smaller country will be invaded first. We explore these issues below.
To capture the market size asymmetry formally, we amend the demand function in expression (1a) and assume the demand in Home is now given by Q a p and EE R 2 sections move outwards (i.e., they rotate clockwise around the points at which they intersect the 0 2  q locus). Note that the first superscript of i R refers to firm one's export status, while the second indicates the export status of firm two.
Next, we will discuss the effects of multilateral trade liberalisation, starting with a situation of autarky, and then lowering trade costs until trade is fully liberalised. When market sizes differ sufficiently, we find that, unlike in the symmetric case, there is no region with multiple equilibria. This allows us to distinguish between a "large" and a "small" market asymmetry, where the former is defined as a market asymmetry that is sufficiently large to exclude multiple equilibria for all trade costs. As will be explained, the "small" market asymmetry case combines features of the large market asymmetry case and the case with market symmetry.
Large asymmetry
We first discuss how asymmetric markets affect the path of trade liberalisation when the Home market is sufficiently large relative to the Foreign market to exclude multiple equilibria for all trade cost. Starting at autarky for prohibitive trade costs, the first equilibrium that prevails as trade costs are lowered involves the Foreign firm, producing 24 for its domestic market only, deterring exports from the Home firm into Foreign: as t falls below the prohibitive level, the Foreign firm's R&D investment increases to deter firm 1's exports and welfare in Foreign rises (in Home, nothing changes relative to autarky).
As t continues to fall, it will reach a level at which exports from the Home firm will no longer be blocked and one-way trade occurs with the Home firm exporting to Foreign (this equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 6a 
Asymmetric costs
We have assumed up to now that the Home and Foreign firms are ex ante symmetric in the sense that they face the same production and investment cost functions. We have seen that, even then for instance, if their national market sizes differ firms can end up with different innovation levels and marginal production costs. Now, suppose that the firms have different firm-specific cost parameters. We will be brief and simply mention an additional issue that can arise when firms, rather than the size of their domestic market, are ex ante asymmetric. More specifically, if the lower-cost firm had a sufficiently large cost advantage over its rival, the former may actually end up forcing its high-cost counterpart from its own domestic market and can then act as a global monopolist.
Asymmetric trade liberalisation
In autarky. There is an exception to this. We have so far confined discussion to levels of  at which both firms are always active. However, at lower t and higher  the home firm finds it harder to compete with its stronger foreign rival. If the effectiveness of investment,  , is high enough, then welfare is higher at t = 0 than under autarky; however, this only occurs when the Home firm is driven from the market altogether leaving the Foreign firm as a global monopolist.
Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a reciprocal markets model with international R&D intensive firms. The firms use R&D to commit to higher output and thus maintain and increase market share, both to help them penetrate into foreign markets and defend their market share at home from rivals. We examined how trade liberalisation affects innovation, profits and welfare. We found that, compared to the autarky equilibrium, the two-way trade equilibrium involves higher R&D spending and innovation. The fact that firms commit to R&D to manipulate rival outputs and, as a consequence, choose R&D investment above the level that minimises costs, helps to raise overall welfare when trade is opened up. However, this hurts the firms themselves who are caught up in a prisoner's dilemma. We showed that it is precisely because of this strategic investment behaviour that, unlike in the original RM model, trade may, if the effectiveness of investment is sufficiently high, yield higher welfare than autarky at any level of non-prohibitive trade costs.
Unlike in the original RM-model without R&D investment (Brander and Krugman, 1983) , we found that for intermediate degrees of trade liberalisation there exists a range of trade costs at which there are two stable equilibria: in one of the equilibria firms do not export, while there is intra-industry trade in the other. This implies that the path of trade liberalisation is not unique. Like in the original RM-model, the equilibrium with twoway trade is the only one to exist when trade is liberalised sufficiently.
Although we mainly focused on a symmetric set-up, it is straightforward to use our framework to examine a number of asymmetries. We have paid particular attention to the case of trade liberalisation between countries with different market sizes. Focussing on the more interesting case with "large" market size asymmetry, our results show that, as trade costs fall from prohibitively high levels, firms from the larger-sized countries start exporting to the smaller-sized market before (i.e., at higher trade costs than) their counterparts from the smaller-sized country do. Furthermore, firms from the smaller- One natural extension of our model that would be well worth exploring is the issue of mutual forbearance. When large firms compete with each other in more than one market, there is reason to believe that multiplicity of contacts across distinct geographical markets has the potential to foster anti-competitive practices. For instance, facing a process of trade liberalisation, firms may have an incentive to tacitly cooperate in R&D in order to remain in control of their respective domestic markets for longer. Such practices would have important welfare implications and may even lead to perverse trade liberalisation effects. In addition, there is a number of other extensions in which we could allow for more firms and more goods. For instance, it is possible to merge our framework with one in which there are multi-product firms. Extending our model to include these issues provides potentially interesting avenues for future research. 
